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E-Commerce: Choosing the Appropriate
Tax Model
Jeffrey A. Scudder
ABSTRACT. The Internet’s economic role has increased dramatically over the past decade.
Along with many benefits, e-commerce has brought with it some important policy
questions. One question relates to tax policy, and whether Internet transactions should be
subject to sales or use taxes. This paper examines that question, considering factors such
as feasibility, efficiency, fairness (virtual v. “brick-and-mortar” retailers), and legality. The
relationship between e-commerce tax policy and state and local government revenues will
also be addressed. Based on these factors, the evidence suggests that taxing Internet sales
would be feasible, efficient, and provide revenue for important public services.

I. Introduction
The Internet has a substantial impact on the United States and its
economy. Over the past half-decade, e-commerce revenues have
increased six-fold, from about $8 billion in 1996 to more than $40 billion
in 2003 [Goolsbee, 1999, 413 and Newsday, 2002, A48]. Forecasts vary
with respect to future online revenues. Some suggest that online revenues
will grow to $105 billion by 2007 [Newsday, 2002, A48], while others
project $269 billion in sales as early as 2005 [Bakos, 2001, 69]. The
chart below illustrates the rapid growth pattern:

Source: Newsday, 2002, A48.
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The Internet boom has caused several public policy debates that are
relevant for all economic actors. How should Internet content be
monitored to avoid, among other things, the transmission of child
pornography? How can society protect personal information when so
much of it is exchanged electronically with few safeguards? Should ecommerce be subject to taxation, and if so, how? The final question is the
one this paper will attempt to answer.
Various economic actors have competing interests. Consumers are
concerned about having to pay tax on Internet purchases, and about the
possibility that the mechanics of doing so would make e-shopping less
convenient. In that sense there is overlap with corporate interests; in a
2001 survey of Chief Financial Officers by KPMG, 40 percent of
respondents said that a consistent, simple structure was their foremost
concern with any potential e-commerce tax policy [Marshall, 2000, 11].
The same CFOs were more worried about tax issues than about
addressing cultural differences in global online commerce.
Fairness is another concern of the business community. Because
Internet sales are seldom subject to the same sales taxes that “brick-andmortar” retailers are legally obligated to collect, many argue that ecommerce has an unfair advantage in the marketplace. When e-commerce
was in its infancy, policy-makers believed that the risk of halting its
evolution by taxing Internet sales outweighed the benefits of modest tax
revenue, so the issue was overlooked. As the Internet enters adolescence
and its sales continue to grow as a proportion of overall commerce, the
issue has resurfaced. Opponents of Internet taxes counter that there is
little direct competition between “Main Street” businesses and
Amazon.com, for example [Powell, 2000, 39]. Still, the question of
fairness persists and is noteworthy in the larger public policy debate.
The primary concern of governments in this debate is the potential
loss of billions of tax dollars if Internet commerce continues to be largely
tax-free. Goolsbee [2001, 15] notes that “sales taxes account for about 33
percent of state revenues” across the United States. A study by the
University of Tennessee estimated that in 2001 “states, cities, and
counties lost $13.3 billion in revenue from uncollected e-commerce sales
taxes” [Newsday, 2002, A48]. For states like California, New York, and
Texas, the moratorium on Internet taxes that existed in 2001 cost them
more than $1 billion in lost tax collections. Even for Iowa the loss
approached $90 million, according to Donald Bruce in a National Tax
Journal article [2000, 1373]. Bruce’s estimate of revenue loss in 2003
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tops $24 billion nationally. In the midst of an economic downturn and
with dozens of states slashing budgets and services, the loss of potential
revenue has not gone unnoticed.
After reconciling these and other issues, this paper will show that
taxing e-commerce is necessary to strike a fair balance among competitors
in the marketplace and to compensate state and local governments for the
erosion of their traditional tax bases.

II. Political and Legal Background
The debate over Internet taxation began in earnest following the United
States Supreme Court’s 1992 decision in Quill v. North Dakota. In that
case, issues of federalism and state autonomy in determining tax policy
were weighed against the possibility of impeding interstate commerce,
which would be a violation of the Constitution’s Commerce Clause. The
Court’s resolution of the case applied a “nexus” standard to determine
whether mail order (or by extrapolation e-commerce) taxes could be
assessed on transactions. This standard, which is discussed elsewhere in
this paper, requires that an Internet retailer have a physical presence in a
state before that state can collect taxes on any of its sales [Powell, 2000,
39].
Congress approved the Internet Tax Freedom Act (ITFA) in 1998,
which imposed a three-year moratorium on new e-commerce taxes
through late 2001. A focus of the legislation was preventing taxes on
Internet access itself, which some say could impede the growth of its use
and slow the process of bridging the “Digital Divide” [Houghton, 2000,
1351].
ITFA also created the Advisory Commission on Electronic Commerce
(ACEC), a body charged with the task of investigating the potential
effects of Internet taxation and making policy recommendations based on
that research [Curatola, 2000, 18]. The ACEC consisted of 19 members,
including representatives of state and local governments [Powell, 2000,
39]. Although a desired 13-member supermajority was not reached, the
group’s general recommendations were three-fold: no taxes should be
imposed on Internet access; the telecommunications excise tax of 3
percent should be repealed; and the existing sales tax system needs to be
simplified [Curatola, 2000, 19].
Another important political element relates to the stance of state and
local governments. Groups such as the National Governor’s Association
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(NGA) have been instrumental in keeping the door ajar for the eventual
taxation of e-commerce transactions, and have developed specific
proposals for doing so [Powell, 2000, 39]. Some of their ideas will be
discussed later in this paper when various options for implementing a tax
system are examined. A complication arises, however, when one
considers the reality that even the NGA has been unable to definitively
state its own position on the issue of Internet taxation. Virginia Gov.
James Gilmore, who chaired the ACEC, has been publicly opposed to
taxing e-commerce sales for fear of inhibiting Internet growth. Michael
Leavitt, Governor of Utah, has on the other hand led a faction of state
leaders aimed at implementing a “tax with limitations” plan [Powell,
2000, 39].

III. The Question of “Nexus”
Internet transactions are by definition “remote” because they do not
involve direct contact between the seller and buyer. The Supreme Court’s
Quill v. North Dakota “nexus” standard has therefore been applied to
determine whether or not they can be subjected to tax liability. The same
standard is applied to mail-order sales and other remote transactions.
“Simply put, nexus implies a minimum contact with a state to trigger a tax
collection responsibility on behalf of the merchant selling the goods in
State A to the purchaser in State B.” [Crosby, 2000, 28].
The concept of nexus is constantly evolving. For example, “creeping
nexus” occurs when a company expands across state borders and takes on
more of a national presence in the marketplace [Journal of Accountancy,
2001, 24]. In a preemptive move, several major retailers recently
announced that they would voluntarily collect sales taxes on their Internet
commerce sites. Because “there is wide disagreement about what
qualifies as a nexus” and to avoid ultimately being forced to pay backtaxes to some states, companies like Wal-Mart and Target began
expanding their online sales tax collections in early 2003 [Wingfield,
2003, B5].
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, in an effort
to help its members determine their clients’ online tax liability,
formulated the follow criteria to test for the nexus standard [Journal of
Accountancy, 2001, 24]:
1. Is the company’s Internet Service Provider (ISP) physically
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present in the state?
2. Does the company have a server located in the state?
3. What telecommunication services does the company use, and
where are the providers located?
4. What tangible property (e.g. computer servers) does the
company have, and where is it located? Does the company
have customers in the state? How important are they in
relation to the rest of the business?
5. Does the company have a brick-and-mortar affiliate in the
state?
6. Does the company advertise itself as a business in the state?
7. What provision, if any, is made for product repair services
within the state? (For example, the company may sell cars,
television sets, or appliances.)
8. What are the state tax ramifications for transactions
involving barter–for example, with an Internet provider – and
for contractual obligations? Barter transactions are likely to
be taxable, as they often are an exchange of goods or
services.
Under these criteria, meeting the nexus standard is relatively easy.
Firms that are primarily or entirely virtual in their service delivery,
however, still maintain that the standard cannot be easily applied to their
operations. This becomes the crux of the “Virtual v. Main Street” debate,
which will be discussed later.

IV. Adam Smith’s Canons of Taxation
A definition of “efficiency” is important before additional analyses can
be reviewed. Pauline Downer wrote an interesting article in 2001’s
Journal of Financial Management and Analysis that discusses efficiency
in the context of Adam Smith’s canons of taxation: equality; certainty;
convenience of payment; and economy in collection [52]. Neutrality was
also one of Smith’s concerns that Downer discussed.
Downer writes, “The objective of any tax system is to transfer
resources from the private sector to the public sector, influence behavior
and redistribute the wealth of a nation…The goal has been to maintain
neutrality, fairness and simplicity as this serves to advance desirable
economic activity” [2001, 52].
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Equity in the case of e-commerce relates to the Main Street v. ecommerce debate, and suggests that differential tax treatment of ecommerce sales should be ended. It also applies to minimizing the
regressive nature of sales taxes, which will be discussed later. Finally, “a
tax is neutral or efficient when it does not induce tax payers to change
their behavior in response to the tax. Market forces alone should
determine the success or failure of a method of conducting commercial
activities” [Downer, 2001, 52]. This is an argument for equal tax
treatment of e-commerce and traditional sales.
Certainty, convenience of payment, and economy in collection are
sticking points in the debate, since they are presumably more difficult to
achieve in an online environment. Studies suggest that these difficulties
will subside with time, and the issue will be discussed later in the paper.
With respect to neutrality, Downer goes on to say, “The concept of
neutrality assumes that tax law will not impact economic decisions”
[2001, 52]. Here again, the implication is that e-commerce should not be
tax-exempt because it artificially changes economic behavior. Also, the
concept of neutrality will be important later in considering various ways
of collecting Internet sales taxes. For example, an ideal system would not
induce retailers to relocate or make other economic decisions solely on
the basis of tax laws unique to particular states.
Other issues related to more traditional definitions of efficiency will
also be discussed, but Smith’s canons form a solid foundation.

V. Issues of Equity and Efficiency
Several equity issues color the debate over whether Internet commerce
should be taxed. Among these, the widely held belief that exempting ecommerce from sales taxes is unfair to traditional retailers stands out. In
a Publius article, David C. Powell summarizes the argument:
Advocates of state and local taxation of e-commerce fear that
creating a ‘tax-free’ Internet would place traditional retailers at
an unfair disadvantage. Internet e-tailers already have the
advantages of convenience to offer consumers. Coupling this
with the prospect of tax-free transactions discriminates against
traditional bricks-and-mortar retailers. As more expensive items
become the subject of e-commerce, the savings to consumers
could be extensive, thus further eroding traditional commerce.
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[2000, 39].
Powell’s forecast has become more realistic in the past few years.
Concerns about transaction and/or personal identity security have
diminished as mainstream Internet users have become more acclimated
to the purchasing process. And while in its infancy the Internet was only
used to purchase small, easy-to-ship items (e.g. books, music CDs,
novelties, etc.), corporate partnerships between sellers and shippers now
enable a consumer to buy virtually anything online.
Intuitively, the claim that differential tax treatment of traditional and
Internet retailers gives the latter an unfair advantage is reasonable. This
is supported by empirical evidence that e-commerce sales continue to
grow at double-digit rates which far exceed the sales growth of “Main
Street” retailers, or even large volume discounters [Aaron, 2000, 24].
Goolsbee suggests that, “There is clearly an economic distortion created
from diverting commerce from retail stores to on-line ventures simply for
the purpose of avoiding taxes” [2001, 19]. His statement goes to the heart
of the efficiency question raised earlier.
Henry Aaron provides an illustrative analogy in Spectrum: The
Journal of State Government which adds weight to this argument:
Suppose someone proposed the following retail sales tax:
Customers who buy from a store with more than 10,000 square
feet of floor space will pay a 5 percent tax, but customers who
buy from a store with fewer than 10,000 square feet of floor
space will pay no tax. Yes, I know it’s a silly idea. But just to
carry this absurdity a bit farther, assume that some state actually
adopted the proposal. Then, sales in stores with fewer than
10,000 square feet grew more rapidly than did sales in larger
stores. The organization representing small stores pointed to this
fact and argued that they should remain tax-free because low
taxes promote sales growth. No one would take them seriously,
would he? Well, it appears that Virginia Gov. James Gilmore
and U.S. House Budget Committee Chairman John Kasich of
Ohio would–at least if you replaced “stores with fewer than
10,000 square feet” with “Internet commerce” and “stores with
more than 10,000 square feet” with “ordinary retailers. [Aaron,
2000, 24].
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Still, opponents of Internet taxation argue adamantly that the
enhanced growth in e-commerce sales, which is partially due to its tax
exemption, promotes innovation and further development of the Internet
itself. One could postulate further that the Internet enables consumers to
be better-informed, even if eventual purchases are made at “brick-andmortar” retailers. That question raises the issue of overall economic
efficiency.
Some opponents of Internet taxation maintain that e-commerce
growth will expand the broader economy, in part by boosting
productivity. Donald Bruce in the National Tax Journal questions,
however, whether tax exemptions are needed in the long run to achieve
these efficiency gains. “One possible argument for subsidization involves
the presence of a network or information externality that requires a
subsidy to achieve efficiency…It seems hard to imagine that externalities
would remain in the near future, given the expected magnitude of ecommerce transactions over the next several years” [2000, 1373].
Bruce and co-author William F. Fox go on to say that efficiency
losses are “probable” in the event that tax exemptions continue in the
absence of externalities to warrant them. Specifically, if tax rates on
production inputs obtained traditionally are increased to compensate for
tax-exempt e-commerce, the economy could be harmed. This is an
argument in favor of tax parity between traditional and e-commerce
[Bruce, 2000, 1373].
The relationship between personal income levels and Internet usage
represents an additional equity consideration in the debate. Sales taxes
are notoriously regressive. In Washington State, the House of
Representatives’ Office of Program Research estimated the following
relationship between income level and sales tax burden:

Income Level

% of Income Paid in Sales Tax

$20,000-30,000

4.4

$60,000-70,000

3.5

$130,000+

2.2

Source: DeSilver, 2002, A1.
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Similar relationships have been observed nationally. Some say that
exempting online purchases from sales taxes only exacerbates the
regressive nature of sales taxes. This is based on data that clearly shows
a direct relationship between personal income and Internet usage.
The Wall Street Journal recently performed a study that showed this
relationship. According to the report, 80 percent of households earning
more than $100,000 annually have a computer and elective access to the
Internet. Meanwhile, a mere 25 percent of households earning $30,000
or less have personal computers at home. “Web Week Magazine found
that the average income for persons making purchases over the Internet
exceeds $60,000” [Grayson, 1998, 1].
Why is this significant? If Internet transactions are not subject to
sales tax, and if richer consumers are significantly more likely to use the
Internet to make such purchases, then those consumers who were already
bearing a lighter sales tax burden will be able to avoid the tax entirely in
some cases. This makes the tax system even less equitable. “If Internet
purchases are not subject to sales taxes, a person with sufficient means to
have a credit card, a computer, and an Internet access account will be able
to avoid taxation on the purchase of a good or service that would be taxed
if a person without such resources purchased the same or similar good or
service from a neighborhood store” [Grayson, 1998, 1].
In addition to placing a disproportionate tax burden on lower-income
consumers, the Internet’s tax exemption may also reduce government
services. Lost sales tax revenues force state and local governments,
which are largely responsible for subsidizing education and welfarerelated services, to reduce expenditures on those services. “Recent
history suggests that when declining revenues lead states to reduce
services, programs serving low- and moderate-income families and
individuals tend to be hit disproportionately” [Grayson, 1998, 1].
The equity argument is by definition normative. Some retort that
comparing Internet and traditional commerce is like “comparing apples
and oranges.” Often, e-commerce involves selling services as opposed to
tangible goods, which would make sales tax exemptions appear more
legitimate. But serious questions remain as to the efficiency implications
of tax disparities between e-commerce and the traditional retail sector.

VI. Revenue Implications for State and Local Governments
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Perhaps the most quantifiable element of this debate is the revenue
various taxing entities are currently losing because of electronic
commerce. Notwithstanding arguments about the validity of sales taxes
in general, or about the need for Internet retail growth, the data indicate
that some states are losing billions of dollars per year because online sales
are exempt from taxes. Further, the forgone revenue has come in tandem
with lost tax policy autonomy. Federalism has thus been raised as an
issue, and subsequently balanced against the national government’s right
to oversee interstate commerce per the Constitution’s Commerce Clause.
“The precipitous rise in the magnitude of e-commerce could mean
that, although the amount of revenue generated by Internet taxation is
quite minimal, the future potential is unlimited. Preempting state and
local government tax authority in this area could be very detrimental to
state and local coffers in the future.” Powell’s [2000, 39] statement
summarizes the concern held by many states and localities regarding their
long-term revenue stability and their subsequent ability to provide
necessary social services.
The problem of eroding state sales tax bases is not new, nor does it
originate solely with the advent of Internet commerce. Rather, “state
sales tax bases have been declining relative to state personal income for
many years” [Bruce, 2000, 1373]. Bruce claims that in 1979, the average
sales-taxing state had a tax base of 51.4 percent of its personal income.
Less than 20 years later, in 1998, that base had fallen to an average of
42.8 percent of personal income. In his National Tax Journal article,
Bruce identifies three primary reasons for this erosion: 1) growth in
remote sales (e.g. mail-order, e-commerce, etc.); 2) a shift in consumption
from goods to services; and 3) increasing amounts of legislated
exemptions in sales tax codes nationwide. In many cases he says states
have raised tax rates to compensate for this reduced base. In Iowa for
example, sales tax rates would have to be increased 0.5 percentage points
to make up for lost revenues which approached $100 million [Bruce,
2000, 1373].
Some observers say that the growth of the Internet is accelerating the
loss of state revenues. Because many states are in the middle of financial
crises, the acceleration is occurring at the worst possible time. Estimates
of lost revenue run all over the board because it is a difficult variable to
calculate. In 2000, Powell forecast an annual loss of $10 billion by 2003
[39]. Schafer suggested in 2001 that the 2000 tax loss was somewhere in
the $500 million to $4 billion range. Bruce in 2000 agreed with Powell’s
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estimate, and pegged expected tax losses at approximately $10.8 billion
for the year 2003 [1373]. In each case, the number is significant.
As already discussed, the lost revenue disproportionately harms lower
income groups. On the other hand, in absolute terms, the losses will
affect all socio-economic groups. To continue with the Iowa example, the
$90 million in estimated lost revenues for 2003 would fund approximately
half of the real budget deficit faced by the state. In places like California
and New York, the losses top $1 billion.
The magnitude of the lost revenue has led many states to call for
Internet taxation. To the extent that the data represent the true fiscal
picture, the call seems legitimate. If citizens continue to demand
education, health care, welfare, and other services, funds must be raised
to pay for them. A related question becomes how a tax model can most
efficiently and effectively be implemented which both responds to state
and local revenue needs and fosters growth in Internet commerce.

VII. Alternative Ways to Tax E-Commerce
Many opponents of Internet taxation believe that opening the “flood gate”
would result in certain transactions being taxed by multiple jurisdictions.
This concern is magnified by the reality that there are more than 7,500
jurisdictions in the U.S. that currently impose some type of sales tax
[Schafer, 2001, 415].
Opponents of taxing e-commerce also believe that in order to cope
with these duplicative tax jurisdictions, businesses would have to
purchase sophisticated, expensive software to trace purchases and
accurately assign tax liability. The burden of tax compliance would
create deadweight loss, they maintain [Schafer, 2001, 415]. In addition,
the burden would be more harmful for small e-commerce retailers.
According to Bruce, “There is only limited evidence on the compliance
costs of the sales tax. One conclusion is that compliance costs are
disproportionately higher for smaller establishments…A number of states
provide vendor compensation to help offset compliance costs [for smaller
firms], typically in the range of 2% of the volume of taxes collected”
[2003, 25].
Goolsbee acknowledges the compliance concerns, but suggests they
will diminish over time. In 1999 he wrote, “states have a strong incentive
to take up simplifying recommendations to make collection easy…state
governments would have incentives to invest in a low-cost or even free
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system fully linked to popular electronic commerce platforms” [421].
Goolsbee also notes:
Calculation of taxes for each particular jurisdiction may be
tedious, but such a task is well-suited to an electronic
environment. Companies such as Vertex or Taxware International
have produced databases that can calculate the amount of tax to
be collected if given the address of the purchaser and the amount
of the purchase, data known to the merchant for transactions
involving the shipment of physical goods. [1999, 421].
Goolsbee himself suggested that compliance would become easier
over time, and nearly four years have passed since his paper was
published. Nevertheless, any viable proposal to levy sales taxes on ecommerce must strive for simplicity. One such model is a “seller-based
system,” which would call for Internet sellers to levy taxes on purchases
at the rate charged in their own state. This mirrors European systems in
a variety of ways, and reverses the current U.S. focus on the “destination”
of a good or service. It would provide for some funding recovery and
autonomy at the state level [Lee, 1999, 33]. An incentive would be
created, however, for e-commerce retailers to locate in states with lower
or no sales taxes. Moreover, a seller-based system would not address the
equity issue of Main Street v. Internet commerce, because different sales
tax rates would still be possible for a consumer within a given market. A
seller-based system would therefore not address many of the problems
with the status quo.
Another option involves a “buyer-based system” in which current
sales tax laws would be extended to e-commerce transactions. In other
words, if a consumer in Iowa was to purchase online a copy of Atlas
Shrugged by Ayn Rand, that individual would pay sales tax on the book
equivalent to what s/he would pay at a local bookstore in Iowa. Again
this option addresses the revenue issue and provides for autonomy, but it
would be less simple than a seller-based system.
A buyer-based system would require retailers to use zip codes and/or
other means to determine tax liability on sales, and to forward tax
proceeds to the appropriate governments. Since a large proportion of ecommerce transactions occur at a relatively small number of websites, the
process would be more complex than a seller-based system. But
consumers under a buyer-based system would be faced with equal tax
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rates on traditional and e-commerce purchases, which would completely
address the equity issue. Furthermore, no incentives for relocation would
be provided under this system to e-commerce retailers.
Still other alternatives propose a nationwide e-commerce sales tax
that would be divided up on the basis of some formula to each of the
states. Sandi Owen in a Federal Communications Law Journal article
stated that, “Internet transactions have virtually eliminated the geographic
boundaries between states and localities that formerly provided the
framework for sales and use taxation. As a result, a national tax policy
must be developed either through uniform state laws or federal
legislation” [1998, 245].
Other concerns relate to compliance and the feasibility of collecting
Internet sales taxes. “While tax compliance has depended historically on
identifying key taxing points, electronic commerce creates a challenge for
the identification of such points, and such transactions may be prime
candidates for tax evasion” [Owen, 1998, 245]. To be sure, a compliance
and collection strategy would have to be developed simultaneous to any
proposed sales taxes on e-commerce. This too could be costly for the
economy, and would have to be weighed against the expected benefit of
actually collecting e-commerce taxes. Bruce suggests the benefits
outweigh the costs:
There is no question that application of the sales tax to ecommerce poses many challenges and will give rise to additional
administration and compliance costs. But other taxes, including
the corporate income tax and the personal income tax also entail
substantial enforcement and compliance costs. Optimal tax
theory requires an assessment of the relative costs of generating
revenue from alternative tax instruments. There is simply no
evidence that the changes in excess burden plus administration
and compliance costs of taxing e-commerce are sufficiently high
to warrant a blanket exemption of all transactions, or indeed, are
higher than alternative ways of generating funds. [2003, 40].

VIII. Discussion of Limitations
Goolsbee and others were skeptical about taxing Internet transactions
when the first body of research was published on this topic in the late
1990s. Their claims were that e-commerce sales taxes would provide
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insignificant revenue for governments, stifle Internet sales growth, and be
expensive to collect. Goolsbee also disputed many of the calculations of
lost government revenues. But even he predicted that those claims would
reverse themselves over time, and a few years later, his criticisms actually
reinforce the idea that e-commerce should be taxed.
In 1999, Goolsbee conducted a behavioral study of Internet
consumers and suggested, “Evidence…does not seem to point to intense
competition between retail and online commerce at present – consistent
with the notion of the Internet as a trade creator.” That is to say, his
findings were that e-commerce was not cannibalizing traditional retail
sales.
Goolsbee went on to predict, however, that “as time
progresses…and the Internet becomes a larger fraction of total retail, the
competition may become more intense” [1999, 420]. The latter claim is
reflected in e-commerce sales volume data.
With regard to compliance costs and problems, Goolsbee said, “The
goal is to make compliance easy and evasion difficult so that the problem
is limited. In this sense, in the short run, there may be some problems
with trying to enforce sales taxes online, but looking forward, these
problems are likely to lessen in importance” [1999, 422]. Discussions
elsewhere in the paper on the topic of compliance support the final
portion of his statement.
Finally, Goolsbee argued in 1999 that the positive externalities of the
Internet (e.g. information networks) were significant enough to warrant
a sales tax exemption. But in one of his subsequent papers, Goolsbee
summarizes:
As a final thought regarding the domestic taxation of the Internet,
the losses of tax revenue due to e-commerce are likely to be small
in the short run and rise over time. Conversely, any positive
externalities for the economy as a while arising from electronic
commerce and the spread of Internet access are likely to be
largest in the short run and diminish as the Internet becomes an
established retail channel. In such circumstances, choosing not
to enforce online sales taxes aggressively for a few years,
followed by equal treatment once the Internet is established, may
be a desirable outcome as well as being a plausible political
compromise. [Goolsbee, 2001, 21].
The data suggest e-commerce has become “an established retail
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channel.” Thus, Goolsbee’s last sentence seems instructive. Overall, his
predictions have materialized, and suggest that e-commerce sales should
be taxed. Nevertheless, other limitations to this analysis remain. First
and foremost, e-commerce is still relatively “new.” More time needs to
pass before the true impact of online sales on the larger economy is
known. Time-series studies of consumers need to be conducted to detect
changing behaviors. Payment mechanisms for e-commerce transactions
are evolving. As the Internet continues to grow and mature, many of
these questions will be answered more clearly. For now, the question of
whether to tax Internet sales remains, and must be answered in the context
of what we already know–which is that e-commerce is already a “big
deal.”

IX. Conclusion
The legal debate about e-commerce taxation likely will be resolved only
with additional federal legislation. Although online sales still account for
a small proportion of overall commercial activity, their share is growing
at a rate that will bring the issue to the forefront of tax policy debate. By
2005, Bakos predicts that e-commerce transactions will account for
almost 8 percent of all retail sales – up from 1.5 percent in 2000 [2001,
69]. In addition, his forecast is that about 18.5 percent of all sales will be
“affected” by e-commerce via online research. Clearly, e-commerce’s
slice of the overall retail pie is growing rapidly.
Although some argue that the nature of Internet sales inherently is
different from that of traditional retail sales, and that the difference
justifies the existing tax rate disparity, the reality is that issues of equity
and efficiency justify an online sales tax. Doing so would mitigate
increases in the regressive nature of traditional sales taxes, and also
promote broader economic efficiency. The argument that we should
implement an e-commerce sales tax to protect “brick-and-mortar” retailers
is also noteworthy.
Most importantly, decisions should take into account the long-term
impact of exempting Internet transactions from sales tax on governments
that provide core services to society at-large. There is a growing problem
with revenue shortages, in no small part due to the growth of online and
other remote sales that are difficult to tax. If policy-makers allow this
trend to continue, the result could be increases in other taxes that would
damage economic activity even more than taxing Internet sales (e.g.

18

Major Themes in Economics, Spring 2003

income tax rate increases, traditional sales tax increases, etc.).
Finally, a tax model must be chosen. The need for simplicity and
“fairness” in a model requires that we do not double-tax single
transactions. And since legal issues related to state and local autonomy
in determining tax policy suggest that a national Internet sales tax would
be ill advised, one must support the adoption of a buyer-based system.
Such a system would minimize artificial incentives (e.g. relocation) for
retailers, provide maximum autonomy to local taxing authorities, and
fully address the equity issues that have been raised.
As has been discussed, a buyer-based sales tax would also reduce the
impact of the “nexus” debate on the applicability and collection of
Internet taxes, and it would offer states sufficient revenue for sales
originating within their borders. It would be foolish to believe this issue
will ever be “resolved” given the evolutionary nature of the Internet itself.
But for efficiency’s sake, for equity’s, and for the sake of quality
government services–the evidence strongly supports the need for
implementing a universal Internet tax policy.
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